The first five chapters investigate the incentive effects of the reward for labour being inseparably linked to that for entrepreneurship in the labour-managed firm. After an initial analysis of the standard model of such a firm in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 attempts to investigate many issues influencing productivity and efficiency by considering the work-leisure allocation of time as a choice variable. Chapter 3 argues that within the incentive structure there is a direct utility effect arising from the work environment. Chapter 4 considers the effect of different property rights structures on firm behaviour and Chapter 5 discusses the implications of price uncertainty. In these chapters we question the established pessimism concerning the "smallness" and perversity of labour-managed firms by demonstrating under reasonable assumptions (i) higher effort of workers for higher product prices (Chapter 2), (ii) the work-environment effect of reduced worker alienation (Chapter 3) and (iii) the risk-spreading behaviour caused by uncertainty (Chapter 5). In Chapter 6 an incentive scheme to aid the mobility of labour in a labour-managed economy is described and extended to the consideration of individual labour supply. A contrast to the incentive structure of labour-managed firms is considered in Chapter 7 which analyses efficiency aspects of Soviet incentive bonuses of the Kosygin reforms of the mid 1960s with the conclusion that their early amendment was predictable. Chapter 8 investigates the incentive effects of limiting private plot size in a simple collective farm model. This question does not seem to have been considered, yet such restrictions were applied by Kruschev in the late 1950's. Chapters 9 and 10 eschew assumptions of perfect knowledge of planners and consider the relative advantages of using prices, and thus profit incentives, over quotas in a second-best world. The basic model in this area (Weitzman (1974)) is extended in a number of directions.