Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.247024
Title: Game-theoretic analysis of behaviour in the context of long-term relationships
Author: Khodarinova, Larisa
ISNI:       0000 0001 3598 7130
Awarding Body: Nottingham Trent University
Current Institution: Nottingham Trent University
Date of Award: 2002
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Abstract:
In this thesis an approach for modelling social interactions in a context of long-term relationships is developed in order to investigate apparently altruistic behaviour. The common model of social interactions is based on Prisoners' Dilemma game. Considering the interaction of the players not in isolation but in the context of conditions in which it takes place leads to the conclusion that cooperative behaviour may be rational or evolved. In this thesis this idea is taken further to consider different contexts of interaction. Firstly, a three-player model is introduced in which the third player interacts with two other players engaged in a single interaction Prisoners' Dilemma. The existence of the third player in the interaction changes the payoffs in such a way that the two players are induced to cooperate. The Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma is generalised by allowing additional states to exist in the game. This provides the possibility of introducing completely new types of strategies such as "allocating tasks" strategies. These strategies are relevant to the explanation of apparently altruistic behaviour since the observed behaviour for them is: one player cooperates while the other defects. It is shown that "allocating tasks with punishment" and "cooperating with punishment" strategies can be Nash Equilibria. Populations which consist of different mixtures of "allocating tasks (cooperating) without punishment" and "allocating tasks (cooperating) with punishment" players can be the end points of the evolutionary process. There are ranges of parameters in the model for which the non-cooperative strategies considered are not Nash Equilibria, nor are they evolutionarily or asymptotically stable. Therefore, it can be concluded that cooperative populations can evolve under the influence of natural selection and it is possible to evolve to cooperative types of populations from populations initially composed of a majority of uncooperative individuals.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.247024  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Nash equilibria
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