Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.730589
Title: Damages for misrepresentation
Author: Niranjan, V.
ISNI:       0000 0004 6498 4790
Awarding Body: University of Oxford
Current Institution: University of Oxford
Date of Award: 2015
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Abstract:
This thesis is an investigation of the law of damages for misrepresentation at common law and under the Misrepresentation Act, 1967. It makes three principal claims. First, the relationship that must exist between the making of a false statement and the claimant's reliance on it is one of necessity. In applying this test to individual cases, there is no rule of law that the non-breach position is always that the defendant would have said nothing or that he would have disclosed the truth: it simply depends on what a reasonable defendant would in fact have done. Secondly, the scope of liability for negligent misrepresentation is governed by what this thesis describes as the 'falsity rule'. This is the rule that a loss must be a consequence not only of the making of a false statement but also of its falsity. The rule can be traced to the late nineteenth century and is the best explanation of the SAAMCO case. Contrary to the current orthodoxy, SAAMCO does not in fact endorse the risk theory of remoteness which, in any event, is flawed both as a description of the law and as a matter of principle. Thirdly, the measure of damages under section 2(1) of the 1967 Act is the deceit measure and the measure under section 2(2) is the monetary equivalent of rescission. These provisions have given rise to difficulty principally because their legislative history has not been closely analysed. In truth, Parliament enacted section 2(1) in the mistaken belief that the common law distinguishes between deceit and negligence only for the purpose of actionability, not damages, but a mistake of this kind is conceptually distinct from a mistake about the conventional meaning of words or syntax. For these reasons, it is argued that Royscot is correctly decided but that William Sindall, with respect, is not.
Supervisor: Peel, Ed Sponsor: University of Oxford
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.730589  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Law ; Damages ; Causation ; Fraud ; Remoteness ; Professional Negligence ; Misrepresentation ; Deceit
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