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Title: Neo-Schopenhauerian virtue ethics
Author: Weatherup, Michael Norman
Awarding Body: Queen's University Belfast
Current Institution: Queen's University Belfast
Date of Award: 2017
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Abstract:
In this dissertation I argue that a neo-Schopenhauerian virtue ethic is a viable position in moral philosophy, preferable to deontology, consequentialism and neo-Aristotelianism. I do this by arguing that, as Schopenhauer’s main criticisms of Kant’s moral philosophy apply to contemporary deontology and consequentialism, virtue ethics is preferable to both. I defend the Schopenhauerian claim that compassion is the basis of morality by appealing to its intuitive plausibility and by arguing for a neo-Schopenhauerian version of the Aristotelian idea that the virtues are constitutive of the good life. I further support the claim that compassion is the basis of morality by illustrating how compassion can account for a range of our core moral concepts and intuitions. 1 also defend neo-Schopenhauerianism against, a number of criticisms of virtue ethics in general and neo-Schopenhauerianism in particular. I conclude by arguing that as the Aristotelian virtues of courage, temperance, prudence, etc., could be possessed by someone who is malicious and/or extremely selfish, and so do not capture our intuitions about what makes a person morally good, neo-Schopenhauerian virtue ethics is preferable to Aristotelianism.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.728826  DOI: Not available
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