Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.721051
Title: Networks, social information and compliance
Author: Borzino, Natalia
Awarding Body: University of East Anglia
Current Institution: University of East Anglia
Date of Award: 2016
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Abstract:
The work developed in my PhD on “Networks, Social Information and Compliance” focuses on compliance (voluntary and non), diffusion of information and spillovers in diverse network structures. More specifically, we test experimentally how minimal social information is diffused through different network structures and its role on increasing the level of efficiency along with its positive effect on voluntary compliance of emergent social norms and tax compliance. In the first two chapters, we implement a networked version of the trust game with two senders and one receiver. We manipulate in a minimal way the social information available in the network and, the novelty of our work consists in the introduction of non-binding suggestion about the level of trust and trustworthiness, which is totally fair and (partially) efficient. It is also manipulated in the two studies the selection mechanism of the roles in the game by introducing social status. Our findings suggest that social information has a positive and significant effect on increasing the level of trust in the network. The non-binding suggestion has also a positive and significant effect on individual decisions. In the last chapter, we study in a laboratory experiment how tax compliance information is diffused in a fixed-six-nodes circle network. The game has four information conditions: No Info, Full Info, Positive Info and Negative Info. In the No info treatment, subjects get individual information about whether they were audited, the outcome of it and her final payoff. In the Positive Info (Negative Info) treatment, participants get information whether adjacent connected nodes were audited and found compliant (noncompliant). In the Full Info, participants get both positive and negative signals. We control for the effect of signals on participants’ beliefs on the ex-ante fixed and unknown audit probability by an incentive compatible mechanism. The tax rate and fine rate are fixed and known by the subjects. Our findings suggest that positive and negative signals have a significant effect in the levels of reporting and compliance at individual level. Indeed, diffusion of non-strong negative signal (one bad example) has a negative effect on individuals’ tax compliance. The diffusion of strong positive signals (two good examples) is required to generate any increase in compliance decisions within networks.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.721051  DOI: Not available
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