Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.707431
Title: Individual and group characteristics and their economic implications
Author: Sofianos, Andis
ISNI:       0000 0004 6062 0965
Awarding Body: University of Warwick
Current Institution: University of Warwick
Date of Award: 2016
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Abstract:
This thesis is a collection of studies about the link between individual and group characteristics and economic outcomes. The firstt chapter investigates the link between declared trusting attitudes and trust choices in an infinitely repeated trust game after controlling for subjective beliefs. It is found that intrinsic trust influences the probability of trusting in a trust game. Moreover, intrinsic trust seems to operate through the fact that more trusting individuals are more likely to forgive or offer the bene t of doubt to others and show trust even after a disappointing outcome. The effect of intrinsic trust appears to be independent of the formation of beliefs. The second chapter studies personality trait variation and its implications on society's welfare. Personality is taken to be a type of skill that can be better understood if considered as a distribution rather than a single point. The ABM simulation results reported show that population personality compositions are adaptive on the task (job) distribution. Further simulation results depict the importance for appropriate education to cater for the jobs in the economy. Finally, simulations indicate that precise job match screening is beneficial not only for society's welfare but also for subjective well-being. The third chapter is concerned with how intelligence affects the social outcomes of groups. A systematic study of the link is provided in an experiment where two groups of subjects with different levels of intelligence, but otherwise similar, play a repeated prisoner's dilemma. Initial cooperation rates are similar, but increase in the groups with higher intelligence to reach almost full cooperation, while they decline in the groups with lower intelligence. Cooperation of higher intelligence subjects is payoff sensitive and not automatic: in a treatment with lower continuation probability there is no difference between different intelligence groups.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Economic and Social Research Council
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.707431  DOI: Not available
Keywords: HB Economic Theory
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