Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.705589
Title: The financing innovation in entrepreneurship and hedge funds
Author: Zhang, Hai
ISNI:       0000 0004 6060 755X
Awarding Body: University of Glasgow
Current Institution: University of Glasgow
Date of Award: 2017
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Abstract:
This thesis has developed appropriate dynamic models to shed more light on how pervasive innovation (e.g., equity-for-guarantee swaps) in entrepreneurship/hedge funds could alleviate the severe financing constraints for entrepreneurs/hedge fund managers who plan to launch new businesses. Chapter 2 considers a risk-averse entrepreneur who invests in a project with idiosyncratic risk and takes debt financing via equity-for-guarantee swaps for diversification benefits. In contrast to the literature, we assume the entrepreneur is unable to get a loan from a bank directly because of the low credibility of the entrepreneur and lack of collateral and therefore, an innovative financial contract, equity-for-guarantee swaps, is signed among a bank, an insurer, and the entrepreneur. The new swap not only solves the serious problems of widespread financing constraints, but also significantly improves the welfare level of the entrepreneur. Chapter 3 develops a new financial derivative product called fees-for-guarantee swap to alleviate financing constraints of ESFs managers as well as mitigate the manager’s risk shifting behaviour. Numerical results indicate that the incentive compensation, managerial ownership and the possibility of fund liquidation significantly mitigate the manager’s risk shifting incentive. In Chapter 4, a dynamic valuation model of the hedge fund seeding business has been built to study the consumption and portfolio choice problem for a risk-averse manager who launches a hedge fund via a seeing vehicle. This vehicle, i.e. fees-for-seed swap, specifies that a strategic partner (seeder) provides a critical amount of capital in exchange for participation in the funds revenue. If structured properly this seeding vehicle could lead to Pareto improvement, as it alleviates the ESFs manager’s financial constraint, helps seeder get high potential return for good performance and ordinary investors are more willing to invest in funds backed up by seeding investment.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.705589  DOI: Not available
Keywords: HB Economic Theory ; HG Finance
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