Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.703759
Title: The concept of morality
Author: Bowes, Pratima
Awarding Body: University of London
Current Institution: Royal Holloway, University of London
Date of Award: 1955
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Abstract:
Moral judgments, unlike judgments that are purely descriptive accounts of facts, are characterised by a certain approach to the objects concerned. This approach is from a value point of view, and to look at facts from this point of view is ultimately to assess them in the light of certain standards which embody conceptions of what are intrinsically valuable in human character, conduct and relations. The concepts that are used in moral discourse have to be understood in relation to this point of view. The business of moral philosophy is then to analyse the meaning of such concepts when they are used consistently within this point of view. To say this is to imply that moral discourse ought to be considered objective in some sense - in the sense that is implied in saying that moral concepts are related to a characteristic point of view which any rational being may find to be worthy of acceptance. It is in this sense that moral concepts may be considered to be concerned with facts as opposed to what are not facts either in the sense that they are not acceptable or in the sense that they are pure figments of the imagination. To say this however is not to say that particular moral judgments can be proved to be true or false in the same way in which judgments that are technically scientific can be. For questionable moral judgments are passed on issues that are complex, and a complex situation confers on the agent the responsibility of assessing its value-relevance - anactivity which cannot be bound by rules. But moral judgments, some at any rate, can be considered to be more or less tenable in the light of standards that one may reasonably accept as relevant under the circumstances.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.703759  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Philosophy
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