Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.702965
Title: AIDS denialism in South Africa : a case study in the rationality and ethics of science policy
Author: Furman, Katherine
ISNI:       0000 0004 6059 8104
Awarding Body: London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
Current Institution: London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
Date of Award: 2016
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Abstract:
From 28 October 1999 to 26 September 2000 Mbeki publically endorsed the position of ‘denialist’ AIDS scientists – a marginal group who oppose the claim that HIV causes AIDS – and used their views as the basis for a policy of not providing ARVs (antiretrovirals – the treatment that prevents HIV from replicating) via the public health system. This policy persisted until 2004, with severe consequences – best estimates indicate that it resulted in 171,000 avoidable new infections and 343,000 deaths over the 1999 – 2002 period. I use this case to address two questions. First, is it reasonable for policy makers to consult non-mainstream scientists in the process of policy development? Second, can they be held personally morally responsible for the consequences of having done so when things go very badly wrong? I begin by providing a motivation for why philosophers should be interested in real-world cases. Having justified the philosophical “methodology” of this thesis, I move on to describing the specific case of South African AIDS denialism in the early 2000s. I then take a chronological step back in order to assess the rationality of accepting HIV as the sole cause of AIDS in 1984, when the virus was first identified. I argue that it was rational, but that some explanatory power was lost when other competing accounts of the disease’s aetiology were discarded. I argue that this explanatory loss can be accounted for by re-considering the way causation is understood in biomedicine and epidemiology. Having settled the scientific issues of the case, I then move on to the question of moral responsibility. I specifically look at when an agent can be held morally responsible for their ignorance, and the role of suppressed disagreement in the production of that ignorance.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.702965  DOI: Not available
Keywords: RA0421 Public health. Hygiene. Preventive Medicine
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