Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.702032
Title: Analysis of bandwidth attacks in a bittorrent swarm
Author: Adamsky, Florian
ISNI:       0000 0004 5994 6693
Awarding Body: City, University of London
Current Institution: City, University of London
Date of Award: 2016
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Abstract:
The beginning of the 21st century saw a widely publicized lawsuit against Napster. This was the first Peer-to-Peer software that allowed its users to search for and share digital music with other users. At the height of its popularity, Napster boasted 80 million registered users. This marked the beginning of a Peer-to-Peer paradigm and the end of older methods of distributing cultural possessions. But Napster was not entirely rooted in a Peer-to-Peer paradigm. Only the download of a file was based on Peer-to-Peer interactions; the search process was still based on a central server. It was thus easy to shutdown Napster. Shortly after the shutdown, Bram Cohen developed a new Peer-to-Peer protocol called BitTorrent. The main principle behind BitTorrent is an incentive mechanism, called a choking algorithm, which rewards peers that share. Currently, BitTorrent is one of the most widely used protocols on the Internet. Therefore, it is important to investigate the security of this protocol. While significant progress has been made in understanding the Bit- Torrent choking mechanism, its security vulnerabilities have not yet been thoroughly investigated. This dissertation provides a security analysis of the Peer-to-Peer protocol BitTorrent on the application and transport layer. The dissertation begins with an experimental analysis of bandwidth attacks against different choking algorithms in the BitTorrent seed state. I reveal a simple exploit that allows malicious peers to receive a considerably higher download rate than contributing leechers, thereby causing a significant loss of efficiency for benign peers. I show the damage caused by the proposed attack in two different environments—a lab testbed comprised of 32 peers and a global testbed called PlanetLab with 300 peers. Our results show that three malicious peers can degrade the download rate by up to 414.99 % for all peers. Combined with a Sybil attack with as many attackers as leechers, it is possible to degrade the download rate by more than 1000 %. I propose a novel choking algorithm which is immune against bandwidth attacks and a countermeasure against the revealed attack. This thesis includes a security analysis of the transport layer. To make BitTorrent more Internet Service Provider friendly, BitTorrent Inc. invented the Micro Transport Protocol. It is based on User Datagram Protocol with a novel congestion control called Low Extra Delay Background Transport. This protocol assumes that the receiver always provides correct feedback, otherwise this deteriorates throughput or yields to corrupted data. I show through experimental evaluation, that a misbehaving Micro Transport Protocol receiver which is not interested in data integrity, can increase the bandwidth of the sender by up to five times. This can cause a congestion collapse and steal a large share of a victim’s bandwidth. I present three attacks, which increase bandwidth usage significantly. I have tested these attacks in real world environments and demonstrate their severity both in terms of the number of packets and total traffic generated. I also present a countermeasure for protecting against these attacks and evaluate the performance of this defensive strategy. In the last section, I demonstrate that the BitTorrent protocol family is vulnerable to Distributed Reflective Denial-of-Service attacks. Specifically, I show that an attacker can exploit BitTorrent protocols (Micro Transport Protocol, Distributed Hash Table, Message Stream Encryption and BitTorrent Sync) to reflect and amplify traffic from Bit-Torrent peers to any target on the Internet. I validate the efficiency, robustness, and the difficulty of defence of the exposed BitTorrent vulnerabilities in a Peer-to-Peer lab testbed. I further substantiate lab results by crawling more than 2.1 million IP addresses over Mainline Distributed Hash Table and analyzing more than 10,000 BitTorrent handshakes. The experiments suggest that an attacker is able to exploit BitTorrent peers to amplify traffic by a factor of 50, and in the case of BitTorrent Sync 120. Additionally, I observe that the most popular BitTorrent clients are the most vulnerable ones.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.702032  DOI: Not available
Keywords: QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
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