Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.694623
Title: A Rylean account of intelligent actions and activities
Author: Espejo-Serna, Juan C.
ISNI:       0000 0004 5992 4224
Awarding Body: University of Warwick
Current Institution: University of Warwick
Date of Award: 2016
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Abstract:
Gilbert Ryle claimed that intelligent actions and activities are not merely the external signs of inner mental workings but rather that such actions and activities are the workings of the mind itself. In this thesis I propose an interpretation and defence of sich claim, against a common an, in my view, mistaken way of understanding Ryle's position. In chapter [1]. I introduce the argumentative thread of this thesis and a more detailed overview of the chapters. In chapter [2], I criticise Stanley and Williamson's understanding of Ryle's argument and position. In chapters [3]-[5] I examine Ryle's position and provide a way of understanding his view against what I take his main opponent, INTELLECTUALISM, to be. Chapter [6] offers an argument against INTELLECTUALISM as a way of motivating a Rylean account intelligent actions and activities. I conclude in chapter [7] with a response to purported counter-examples to the view I propose.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.694623  DOI: Not available
Keywords: B Philosophy (General)
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