Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.693750
Title: Essays on robust mechanism design
Author: Long, Yan
ISNI:       0000 0004 5989 1581
Awarding Body: University of Glasgow
Current Institution: University of Glasgow
Date of Award: 2016
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Abstract:
Chapter 1: Under the average common value function, we select almost uniquely the mechanism that gives the seller the largest portion of the true value in the worst situation among all the direct mechanisms that are feasible, ex-post implementable and individually rational. Chapter 2: Strategy-proof, budget balanced, anonymous, envy-free linear mechanisms assign p identical objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of surplus loss to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-negative valuations. The smallest efficiency loss is uniquely achieved by the following simple allocation rule: assigns one object to each of the p−1 agents with the highest valuation, a large probability to the agent with the pth highest valuation, and the remaining probability to the agent with the (p+1)th highest valuation. When “envy freeness” is replaced by the weaker condition “voluntary participation”, the optimal mechanism differs only when p is much less than n. Chapter 3: One group is to be selected among a set of agents. Agents have preferences over the size of the group if they are selected; and preferences over size as well as the “stand-outside” option are single-peaked. We take a mechanism design approach and search for group selection mechanisms that are efficient, strategy-proof and individually rational. Two classes of such mechanisms are presented. The proposing mechanism allows agents to either maintain or shrink the group size following a fixed priority, and is characterized by group strategy-proofness. The voting mechanism enlarges the group size in each voting round, and achieves at least half of the maximum group size compatible with individual rationality.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.693750  DOI: Not available
Keywords: HB Economic Theory
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