Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.680810
Title: Acting and understanding
Author: Blomberg Stathopoulos, Alexander C.
ISNI:       0000 0004 5917 200X
Awarding Body: University of St Andrews
Current Institution: University of St Andrews
Date of Award: 2016
Availability of Full Text:
Access through EThOS:
Access through Institution:
Abstract:
This thesis concerns the question of what it is for a subject to act. It answers this question in three steps. The first step is taken by arguing that any satisfactory answer must build on the idea that an action is something predicable of the acting subject. The second step is taken by arguing in support of an answer which does build on this idea, and does so by introducing the idea that acting is doing something which is an exercise of a particular kind of disposition on the part of the acting subject. The third step is taken by arguing that the disposition in question must be of a kind which is exercised in conditions in which the acting subject thinks they are acting. From this vantage point the thesis develops many further commitments: That action is constitutively subject to a mode of explanation that mentions the kind of disposition just mentioned; that any case of acting requires a veridical representation of a means by which the action is performed; and that a problem about the underspecified nature of desire ascriptions can be solved by appeal to the conceptual materials made available by these investigations. The thesis finally develops several objections to the account it gives, both substantive and methodological, and explains why these objections ought to be rejected.
Supervisor: Haddock, Adrian ; Millar, Alan Sponsor: Royal Institute of Philosophy ; Erik & Gurli Hultengren ; Gunvor & Josef Anér ; University of Stirling
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.680810  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Intentional action ; Practical knowledge ; Desire ; Belief ; Circularity ; Self-reference ; Desire ascription ; Predication ; Events ; Basic action ; Action explanation ; Causation ; B105.A35B6 ; Act (Philosophy)
Share: