Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.664181
Title: Corporate governance and political involvement in Japan and Taiwan
Author: Yu, H.-Y.
Awarding Body: University of Edinburgh
Current Institution: University of Edinburgh
Date of Award: 2007
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Abstract:
This thesis examines issues associated with the interaction of government and financial institutions in the operation of a company through the board of directors in Japan and Taiwan. Specially, it highlights the relationships between a company, the main bank system, and the system of amakudari (appointing retired bureaucrats to the board of public companies). The focus is on why government and financial institutions intervene in the operation of a company, and how these government and financial institutions influence the operation of a company through the board of directors. The empirical results suggest that governments and financial institutions tend to appoint representatives to the board in order to help troubled companies. On the other hand, a negative relationship is established between the presence of retired bureaucrats (amakudari) and subsequent firm performance and the degree of internationalisation. Thus, while the system of amakudari may use its power in an attempt to save troubled companies, the monitoring ability of the board may be jeopardised to the detriment of firm performance and international expansion. The empirical results also demonstrate that intervention from governments and financial institutions is an integral part of the operation for a company in Japan and Taiwan. Furthermore, with the latest reform of corporate governance in Taiwan, this thesis also introduces the institutional background of employees’ incentive payment and sub-committees and examines whether firm performance and the corporate governance mechanism are related to the level and the structure of CEO compensation and employees’ incentive payments. The empirical results indicate that the alignment between executives’ and shareholders’ interests is not less efficient in government-linked companies (GLCs) compared to non government-linked companies (non-GLCs). Additionally, although the Taiwanese authorities have started to reform corporate governance in Taiwan, grants of incentive payment to CEOs and employees are not necessarily related to performance or the corporate governance mechanism.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.664181  DOI: Not available
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