Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.663034
Title: Perceptual control of interceptive timing
Author: Tresilian, James R. S.
Awarding Body: University of Edinburgh
Current Institution: University of Edinburgh
Date of Award: 1992
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Abstract:
The question of how actions involving the interception of moving objects are perceptually timed is addressed. This question has been intimately bound up with a debate which sets the 'ecological' approach to perception and action (due to Gibson) in opposition to approaches which employ computational concepts. It is argued that modern versions of the two types of approach are not, in fact, opposed but are largely complementary and frequently equivalent. A general approach for tackling problems of peceptuo-motor control in humans and animals which integrates the two approaches is outlined. The problem of how interceptions of moving objects are perceptually controlled is investigated according to this general approach. First, the informational requirements of interceptive actions are analyzed. It is concluded that 'time-to-contact' information is critical for accurate timing. The hypothesis, due to Lee, that animals and people assume the relative velocity between target and interception point to be constant when computing time-to-contact is discussed. A scheme for the continuous control of interceptive timing based on this strategy is formulated. Having established how time-to-contact information might be used to control interceptive timing the question of the perceptual source of this informtion is examined. A mathematical analysis of the visual stimulus is provided which clarifies and extends Lee's theory concerning the visual source of time-to-contact information.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.663034  DOI: Not available
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