Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.658169
Title: Essays in market microstructure
Author: Palazzo, Francesco
ISNI:       0000 0004 5352 3411
Awarding Body: London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
Current Institution: London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
Date of Award: 2015
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Abstract:
This dissertation contains three theoretical essays on the functioning and the organization of over the counter markets. The first paper, "Is Time Enough to Alleviate Adverse Selection?," considers a dynamic adverse selection model in which sellers pay a search cost to find a new buyer. I uncover a relationship between adverse selection and the magnitude of search costs. Interestingly, small search costs may increase the severity of the adverse selection problem, ultimately leading to a lemons market. A market design intervention may mitigate adverse selection and promote full market participation. Conditional upon an adequate level of information disclosure, a per period market participation tax, coupled with a final rebate once a seller trades, introduces a credible signalling device. The second paper, "Peer Monitoring Incentives via Central Clearing Counterparties," studies how the novel introduction of mandatory clearing for over the counter financial assets may affect dealers’ incentives to monitor each other’s. The design of the loss allocation rules is crucial. To maximize peer monitoring incentives, a higher share of losses should be payed by surviving members with a greater trade exposure to the defaulting dealer. In practice, this mechanism can be implemented through variation margin haircutting. If all members should contribute, equilibrium outcomes may be inferior to what can be achieved without clearing. The third paper, "Learning and Price Dynamics in Durable Goods Markets," is joint work with Min Zhang. We set up a dynamic model with two key features: first, agents enjoy heterogeneous use values, and later resell the good; second, prices do not incorporate all available information. Informational frictions slow down learning, and affect price movements asymmetrically in high and low aggregate demand states. Learning and the resale motive are the predominant force for durable goods with short resale horizons, slow time-varying aggregate demand, and similar use values among buyers.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.658169  DOI: Not available
Keywords: HB Economic Theory
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