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Title: Being apart from reasons
Author: Michelon, C. F.
Awarding Body: University of Edinburgh
Current Institution: University of Edinburgh
Date of Award: 2001
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Abstract:
This thesis is an attempt to restore the employment of reasons to its rightful place as a morally valuable decision-making method. In order to do so, arguments are provided that aim at proving that there are other decision-making methods which are allowed and, sometimes, required by morals, which are not reasoning. That would only be true if there are substantive moral reasons which apply to the decision-making process through which an action was brought about, so that to action that only differ in that they were brought about in different ways might be considered to be different sorts of action when viewed from a moral point of view. Those arguments explain how it is possible to conceive a richer morality of decision-making processes that has a place for, but is not reduced to, the use of reasons. In order to restore the employment of reasons to its rightful place, arguments are also provided to prove that public agents are always required to reason comprehensively (instead of, e.g. following their inclinations or reasoning from an incomplete set of reasons). Many contemporary philosophers attempted to justify constrains to the employment of reasons by public agents, so that public agents should not be allowed to use all sorts of reasons in the process of deciding what to do. Some reasons are said to be excluded by kind from the set of reasons available to them. In order to conclude that public agents should decide from a complete set of reasons (i.e. from a set of reasons from which no reason was excluded by kind), the author deals with three contemporary attempts to, directly or indirectly, justify the exclusion by kind of some reasons from the decision-making of public agents, namely, the Neutralist Public Liberal justification for the insulation of the right from the good, Raz's theory of Legitimate Authority and, finally, Haberman's theory of law, as it was put forward in Between Facts and Norms.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.657737  DOI: Not available
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