Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.655658
Title: The epistemic defeat of a priori and empirical certainties : a comparison
Author: Melis, Giacomo
ISNI:       0000 0004 5366 4142
Awarding Body: University of Aberdeen
Current Institution: University of Aberdeen
Date of Award: 2014
Availability of Full Text:
Access through EThOS:
Full text unavailable from EThOS. Please try the link below.
Access through Institution:
Abstract:
I explore the traditional contention that a priori epistemic warrants enjoy some sort of higher epistemic security than empirical warrants. By focusing on warrants that might plausibly be called 'basic', and by availing myself of an original taxonomy of epistemic defeaters, I defend a claim in the vicinity of the traditional contention. By discussing some examples, I argue that basic a priori warrants are immune to some sort of empirical defeaters, which I describe in detail. An important by-product of my investigation is a novel theory of epistemic defeaters, according to which only agents able to engage in higher-order epistemic thinking can suffer undermining defeat, while wholly unreflective agents can, in principle, suffer overriding defeat.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: University of Aberdeen ; Royal Institute of Philosophy
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.655658  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Certainty ; Theory of knowledge
Share: