Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.655034
Title: Defeasible knowledge
Author: Moeller, Emil Frederik Lundbjerg
ISNI:       0000 0004 5215 3578
Awarding Body: University of Oxford
Current Institution: University of Oxford
Date of Award: 2014
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Abstract:
This dissertation collects five papers that discuss potential consequences of the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 5 provide arguments for a number of important epistemological consequences of the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapter 4 discusses consequences that others have claimed the defeasibility of knowledge to have. Chapter 1 argues that closure principles for knowledge are in tension with the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapter 2 argues that one of Williamson's famous arguments against the KK principle relies in a problematic way on a closure principle that is incompatible with defeat. Chapter 3 argues that a view on which knowledge just is belief safe from error is in tension the defeasibility of knowledge. Chapter 4 discusses two arguments to the effect that defeat by higher-order evidence sometimes involves the violation of rational ideals or rules of rational belief formation. As part of a response to an objection to contextualism about 'know', Chapter 5 investigates a number of social epistemological consequences of the defeasibility of knowledge.
Supervisor: Hawthorne, John Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.655034  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Philosophy ; Epistemology,causation,humankind ; Knowledge ; Defeasibility ; Misleading Evidence ; Williamson
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