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Title: The political economy of clientelism : economic reforms in pre-crisis Greece, 1985-2004
Author: Trantidis, Aris
Awarding Body: King's College London (University of London)
Current Institution: King's College London (University of London)
Date of Award: 2013
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How do patron-client relations interfere with economic policy-making? Does clientelism have a distinctive impact on policy reform compared to typical interest-group activity and party politics? Using an analytic narrative and a comparative approach, the thesis studies economic reforms in Greece, a clientelist political system, to test and refine a number of hypotheses on the impact on clientelism on policy reform. The thesis casts light on the distinct properties of the clientelist system of interest intermediation, and explains why resistance to reform is likely to be stronger compared to typical interest-group analysis. Interdependencies between parties and clients introduce a systematic bias in the design of economic policy in favour of preserving clientelist supply even under pressing economic conditions and strong international commitments. Unlike the typical context of interestgroup competition, government autonomy to shift social alliances or forge new ones over proposed policies is expected to be considerably limited in a clientelist system, given that placing limits to the supply of patronage will primarily affect relations inside the party and, ultimately, its cohesion and mobilisation capacity.
Supervisor: Pennington, Mark Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available