Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.645590
Title: An analysis of the government-industry relationship in the British pharmaceutical price regulation scheme
Author: Sedgley, Michael David
Awarding Body: London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
Current Institution: London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
Date of Award: 2004
Availability of Full Text:
Access through EThOS:
Full text unavailable from EThOS. Please try the link below.
Access through Institution:
Abstract:
This thesis examines the government-industry relationship in the regulation of pharmaceutical prices in the UK, through the pharmaceutical price regulation scheme (PPRS). It takes a broadly institutionalist approach to explaining and understanding the design and persistence of this idiosyncratic form of pharmaceutical cost control. Broad factors such as the global nature of the pharmaceutical industry and its industrial importance in the British economy, as well as the conception of the British state's role, the place of parliament in framing regulation and the organisation of the executive all play a part in underpinning the PPRS as a co-operative policy community between government and industry for the control of medicine costs to the NHS. Key to the dynamics of this sector of policy is the interplay between the industrial policy and health policy concerns of government, in a unique relationship in which government is both the primary sponsor and customer of the industry. The thesis develops a theoretical framework and five working hypotheses for the study of three cases of policy development in the PPRS during the 1990s. The empirical research is undertaken through interviews with key players across industry, government and parliament, as well as the analysis of government and industry documents and legislation.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.645590  DOI: Not available
Share: