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Title: The political economy of financial regulatory agencies
Author: Kleibl, Johannes
Awarding Body: University of Essex
Current Institution: University of Essex
Date of Award: 2014
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The unprecedented regulatory failures of the global financial crisis forced governments and regulators around the world to fundamentally rethink their regulatory approaches and supervisory practices. Yet, they also revealed that existing political science research provided surprisingly few insights into the cross-national causes and consequences of financial regulatory structures and financial regulators' regulatory policy-making. lVIy dissertation aims at filling some of these gaps by improving our understanding of the political determinants and effects of financial regulatory institutions. Using newly collected comparative data, I analyse the political economy of the diffusion, replacement and policy-making of financial regulatory agencies in three empirical papers. The first paper of my dissertation examines the diffusion of financial regulatory institutions across countries.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available