Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.635618
Title: Imperfect competition and market structure with asymmetric information : the Italian banking sector
Author: Pavanini, Nicola
ISNI:       0000 0004 5357 7620
Awarding Body: University of Warwick
Current Institution: University of Warwick
Date of Award: 2014
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Abstract:
This thesis studies the relationship between asymmetric information, imperfect competition, and market structure in the Italian banking sector. In three coherently connected chapters it extends and adapts different structural models from the literature in empirical industrial organization to the special case of the credit market, introducing informational asymmetries between lenders and between borrowers and lenders. The first chapter gives an introductory overview of the thesis, outlying the fundamental contribution of each paper. In the second chapter, we measure the consequences of asymmetric information in the Italian market for small business lines of credit. We estimate models of demand for credit, loan pricing, loan use, and firm default based on the seminal work of Stiglitz and Weiss [1981]. Preliminary results suggest evidence of asymmetric information, separately identifying adverse selection and moral hazard. We use our results to quantify the impact of asymmetric information on pricing and welfare, and the role imperfect competition plays in mediating these effects. In the third chapter, we look at whether asymmetric information is a potential determinant of market structure in the banking industry. We measure welfare under different counterfactual scenarios, with and without borrower-lender asymmetric information and reducing incumbents’ informational advantage. We develop a dynamic structural game of banks’ entry, exit and investment with learning by branching based on Weintraub et al. [2008b], together with a static framework of firms’ demand for credit, loan size, default and banks’ pricing, that allows us to identify the effect of asymmetric information on market structure. In the fourth chapter, we measure the impact of endogenous multi market contact on entry decisions of Italian national banks. We develop a static model of market structure with incomplete information as in Seim [2006], allowing for global players’ heterogeneity and spatial correlation of entry decisions across different local markets. Preliminary results show that multi market contact enhances banks’ profitability, suggesting that it might facilitate implicit collusion as in Bernheim and Whinston [1990]. The fifth chapter concludes, summarizing the main findings and tracing out the directions for future research.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy, University of Warwick
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.635618  DOI: Not available
Keywords: HB Economic Theory ; HG Finance
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