Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.634036
Title: Corruption and institutions : the Nigerian electric power sector (1999-2009)
Author: Nane, Grimot
Awarding Body: London South Bank University
Current Institution: London South Bank University
Date of Award: 2012
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Abstract:
The thesis focuses on institutional sources of corruption and their relationship with incidences of corruption in the Nigerian Electric Power Sector (NEPS). Another focus of the research is on the interactions and tensions between formal and informal institutions in the governance of NEPS with particular emphasis on enforcement. The main purpose of this research is to provide a number of contributions to the literature on corruption. Three different research methodologies were employed to undertake the research on corruption in the NEPS in Nigeria. Qualitative analysis was carried out to investigate the underlying institutional mechanisms of corruption; the Delphi Method was employed for undertaking institutional analysis of enforcement and its conditions; and quantitative analysis (OLS and logistic regression) was adopted to analyse the relationships of co-existence between institutional failure and direct experiences of corruption. The choice of three different methodologies was deemed necessary to generate analyses on various aspects of corruption that would not be possible using only a single method. A new approach to the institutional analysis of corruption was presented in the form of Sircoh Institutional Analysis (SIA). SIA is used to investigate corruption at the level of Sircoh bundles in conjunction with banditry analysis of the political economy, as a pre-condition for Sircoh bundle analysis, and the bureaucratic morality analysis of public servants behaviour, as a consequence. Key hypotheses were also framed to investigate the relationship between (x) sources of institutional failures as independent variables, (y) direct experiences of corruption and (z) informal and moral influences that facilitate or inhibit corruption. A new explanation of corruption known as the “logic of relevance” was developed. The logic of relevance as an explanatory tool proposes that where banditry (and especially roving banditry) exists in a given economy the dependence of actors and agents on state resources (institutional benefits) ix creates competition amongst them. Access to institutional benefits by actors and agents under the conditions of uncertainty of competition becomes increasingly secured by the acquisition of social relevance within the social structure of society. The underlying mechanisms by which corruption takes place are investigated and the central contribution is the development and empirical analysis of the concept of contrary institutions. From the analysis, it was found that the internal mechanisms of institutions in NEPS lacked internal legitimacy and consistency, which undermined the functioning of the institutions even though the external mechanisms appeared consistent and enforceable. Contrary institutions were found to be particularly susceptible to informalities, social pressures and collusive behaviour amongst agents. The typology of corruption in NEPS was analysed was found to be a significant empirical indicator of corruption. The Sircoh Institutional Analysis (SIA) is used to investigate the tensions between formal and informal institutions and the coordination of governance in NEPS. From the first component of SIA, the political economy of Nigeria was found to be dominated by roving banditry. From the second component, it was found that the influences of informal institutions prevailed over the enforcement of formal institutions at all levels. The third component, bureaucratic morality analysis, revealed that qualities such as trust, fairness and discipline amongst public servants were low due to the consequences of institutional failure and corruption. The banditry analysis component is modified by extension to produce (a) a comprehensive taxonomy of roving banditry and (b) an evaluation of the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. Robust regression (OLS and logistic) analysis techniques were used to establish statistical relationships between sources of institutional failure and experiences of corruption. Interference from corporations was found that the dominant source of institutional failure that engendered corruption in NEPS. Other factors of institutional failure include interference from power elites and inadequate enforcement of institutions by government. The regression analysis was also used as a robust tool to empirically validate a broad range of findings x from the qualitative and Delphi analyses. The hypotheses were also found to be empirically valid. A solution known as “closing the door” is provided as a potentially effective tool for tackling corruption in NEPS. Corruption in NEPS was deemed to be persistent because of the existence of the “unclosed door syndrome”. “Closing the door” is based on findings produced from the empirical analysis of contrary institutions and Sircoh Institutional Analysis with the necessary condition of consistent and constant enforcement of legitimate formal institutions at all levels attached to it
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.634036  DOI: Not available
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