Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.630125
Title: New perspectives on cooperation and team reasoning : theory and experiments
Author: Smerilli, Alessandra
ISNI:       0000 0004 5352 0851
Awarding Body: University of East Anglia
Current Institution: University of East Anglia
Date of Award: 2014
Availability of Full Text:
Access from EThOS:
Access from Institution:
Abstract:
Players' use of cooperative strategies in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games and their achievement of coordination in some kinds of coordination games are among the most studied issues in both theoretical and experimental game theory. The present thesis is a collection of three article on this topic. Chapter 2 of the thesis focuses on cooperation, by developing an evolutionary model of a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, using replicator dynamics. The evolution of cooperation is analysed in terms of the interaction of different strategies, which represent the heterogeneity of forms of cooperation in civil life. One of the results of the paper is the conclusion that cooperation is favoured by heterogeneity: the presence of different kinds of strategies enhances cooperation. A theory that can explain both cooperation and coordination is team reasoning. Chapter 3 represents a development of Bacharach's theory of team reasoning. Starting from a detailed review of Bacharach's writings, and in order to clarify some issues linked to reasoning and frames, I propose a 'vacillation' model in which agents are allowed to have both I and we-concepts in their frames, and can easily switch from one to another. The theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 is followed by an experiment, reported in Chapter 4. The experiment aims at identifying which features of the structure of payoffs in coordination games favour the use of team reasoning, using Level-k theories as the benchmark for the modelling of individual reasoning. We find mixed evidence about level-k and team reasoning theories. In particular team reasoning theory fails to predict choices when it picks out a solution which is Pareto dominated and not compensated by greater equality. This could represent a step forward in investigating the roles of team reasoning and level-k reasoning in explaining coordinating behaviour.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.630125  DOI: Not available
Share: