Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.627928
Title: Meaning and paradox
Author: Pinder, Mark
Awarding Body: University of Bristol
Current Institution: University of Bristol
Date of Award: 2013
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Abstract:
The general theme of this dissertation is meaning and paradox. Or, more precisely, how accounts of the metaphysical determination of meaning are affected by the semantic paradoxes. I focus in particular on those accounts within the Davidsonian tradition-whose key characteristic, roughly speaking, I take to be a commitment to Davidsonian semantics. The question that drives the discussion is as follows. Which (if any) accounts of meaning within the Davidsonian tradition are compatible with the fact that semantic paradoxes arise in natural language? Throughout the dissertation, I use the liar paradox as an archetypal semantic paradox. I consider first the two central extant accounts of meaning within the Davidsonian tradition: the Davidsonian and neo-Davidsonian accounts of meaning. I argue that, in light of the semantic paradoxes, both accounts should be rejected. As a result of the discussion, I then consider, in my terminology, traditional externalist accounts of meaning. I argue that an account of meaning along the lines of David Lewis' interpretationism can be adopted by the fan of Davidsonian semantics, and that the resultant account may be compatible with the fact that semantic paradoxes arise in natural language. I show how the fan of Davidsouian semantics can adopt Lewis' interpretationism. I call the resultant account the DL-hybrid account of meaning. Roughly, the account permits the adoption of a broadly Kripkean response to the paradox: truth conditions for sentences are to be characterised as conditional upon the sentences in question being grounded. I close by arguing that the DL-hybrid account of meaning is compatible with the fact that semantic paradoxes arise in natural language.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.627928  DOI: Not available
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