Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.619289
Title: Edifying judgement : using Rorty to redescribe judgement in the context of 'Philosophy for Children'
Author: Garside, Darren
Awarding Body: University of Bath
Current Institution: University of Bath
Date of Award: 2013
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Abstract:
This thesis makes three original claims: two substantive and one methodological. It locates the thesis in the subject of philosophy of education and uses Richard Rorty’s metaphilosophical work to justify a claim to knowledge. This claim takes the form of a redescription of an established concept, judgement, to increase its usefulness in education. Usefulness is evaluated with regard to new developments in pragmatism that emphasise transitionalism and meliorism. To the best of the writer's knowledge Rorty has not been used in this way. The major substantive claim to knowledge is a redescription of judgement in the educational context of philosophy for children. This thesis argues that understanding judgement as a form of transition is educationally and philosophically useful. In order to make the argument it advances a minor substantive claim by offering a critique of Aristotle, Kant and Dewey that draws attention to a common factor in their philosophy, that of judgement being a property solely attributed to individuals. In outline the thesis consists of five chapters. First, it outlines why judgement might be regarded as a problematic concept before justifying my use of Rorty; second, it advances the major premise that judgement in the works of Aristotle, Kant and Dewey is a figurative account. Next it offers the minor premise that figurative accounts of judgement in philosophy of education are not always useful. In the penultimate chapter it concludes by offering an alternative account of judgement as transition and elaborate upon the emphasis on relationality made possible by the redescription. Finally it shows the implications of this redescription in the context of an educational movement: Philosophy for Children. It argues that Philosophy for Children as a pedagogical movement can exemplify education practices that draw upon my re-conceptualised understanding of judgement. In addition it offers a pathway for future development.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.619289  DOI: Not available
Keywords: LB Theory and practice of education
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