Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.617763
Title: Essays in financial contract theory
Author: Donaldson, Jason
ISNI:       0000 0004 5351 8276
Awarding Body: London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
Current Institution: London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
Date of Award: 2014
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Abstract:
This thesis contains three theory essays on the role of contracting in financial markets. The first essay, called Procyclical Promises, shows that in the presence of two contracting frictions—capital diversion and renegotiation—increasing the cyclicality of an entrepreneur’s output can increase his debt capacity with potentially important implications for the macroeconomy and government policy. The second essay, called The Downside of Public Information in Contracting, studies a principal-agent problem with a verifiable public signal. It demonstrates that when agents are competitive, decreasing the precision of the public signal can be Pareto improving in a wide class of environments. We apply the framework to a problem of delegated portfolio management and argue that our results suggest that regulators should insist that credit ratings agencies coarsen their ratings categories. The third essay, called Credit Market Competition and Corporate Investment, uses a general equilibrium framework to study the effect of the price and supply of credit on firms’ project choices. It shows that for only intermediate levels of credit market competition do firms choose efficient projects.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.617763  DOI: Not available
Keywords: HG Finance
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