Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS:
Title: Four essays on optimal antitrust enforcement
Author: Wandschneider, Frederick
ISNI:       0000 0004 5367 1959
Awarding Body: University of East Anglia
Current Institution: University of East Anglia
Date of Award: 2014
Availability of Full Text:
Access from EThOS:
Access from Institution:
This thesis consists of four essays related to optimal antitrust enforcement. The first essay provides a case study of EC ringleader cartels and discusses by means of a theoretical model the effect of excluding ringleaders from leniency programmes on collusive prices. The second essay adds an experimental investigation of the former, and examines in particular the effects on cartel formation, prices and stability. The third essay experimentally explores the substitutability of antitrust detection rates and fines, and test whether different fine and detection rate combinations with constant expected fines achieve an equal level of deterrence. Lastly, the final essay discusses the role of antitrust enforcement on collusion when firms can engage in avoidance activities.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available