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Title: Unpacking health aid effectiveness
Author: Jalles D'Orey, Maria Ana
Awarding Body: University of East Anglia
Current Institution: University of East Anglia
Date of Award: 2013
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This thesis provides an unpacked analysis of health aid effectiveness using Mozambique as a case-study. It comprises of three main papers of independent but related research. The first paper adds to the literature by employing a new model to study the impact of health aid on health outcomes. By taking into account the heterogeneity that exists in the amount of health aid received between Mozambican provinces, a multilevel model is specified. After recognizing significant variation of health outcomes between provinces, I found no statistical evidence that health aid was a cause of those variations. The second paper provides a systematic analysis of donors’ health aid disbursement decisions in-country. Using a game theoretic framework and grounded in qualitative evidence from Mozambique, this paper shows that donors have allocation tactics other than state-to-state aid to pursue their goals which are translated into opting for alternative channels of delivery. Simultaneously, this research acknowledges the non-passive role of the recipient country, i.e., donors’ decisions of how to allocate aid are mediated by the recipient’s response to their actions. This chapter suggests that recipient-donors’ strategic interactions are crucial to understand donors’ allocation behaviour and have direct consequences for aid effectiveness. The last paper explores empirically and theoretically aid coordination efforts of aid agencies. After providing an insight into the implementation of coordination in the health sector in Mozambique, this chapter explores why different agencies differ in their motivations to coordinate, based on the distinction between public and private good properties of coordination. Finally, using a collective action theory framework and aided by Schelling’s (1973) diagrams, this chapter illustrates why it is so hard to coordinate. My results show that individual incentives to coordinate are neither strong nor stable. Furthermore, the success of coordination depends, inter alia, on the number of agencies that perceive coordination as a public versus private good and the role and involvement of the lead donor and the recipient country.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available