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Title: Coarse correlated equilibria in duopoly games
Author: Sen Gupta, Sonali
ISNI:       0000 0004 1903 3371
Awarding Body: University of Birmingham
Current Institution: University of Birmingham
Date of Award: 2014
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We consider the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) in various contexts; games with quadratic payoff functions (which include Cournot duopoly, public good provision and emission abatement) and a linear duopoly game. For the games with quadratic payoffs we compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE and show that it is achieved by a CCE involving only two strategy profiles. The improvement over and above the Nash equilibrium payoff is substantial in the various economic examples considered for this class of games. In case of the linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric CCE, and any unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID:  DOI: Not available
Keywords: HB Economic Theory