Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.599963
Title: Global financial governance and the question of influence : examining the role private actors play in international financial standardisation
Author: Wann, Joy
Awarding Body: London School of Economics and Political Science
Current Institution: London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London)
Date of Award: 2010
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Abstract:
This study addresses the question of how international financial standardisation is influenced by private actors. It firstly proposes that private influence is part of a 'supply and demand' relationship where regulators demand private power capabilities to enhance their own political or policy needs and private actors willingly supply these capabilities to influence outcomes. Captured outcomes as a result of this relationship are likely to arise when demand for a specific private capability is high; that is, when regulators are not able to fulfil their regulatory roles and policy requirements without private power capabilities, due to the specialised and technical nature of specific regulatory issue areas. However, captured outcomes are not likely to arise when demand for private capabilities is low. Demand for private power may be low when private power capabilities have fulfilled the regulator's initial policy purpose, or when regulators perceive the capability to be a threat to their political and/or policy making authority. Following on from this, the study then explores how supply and demand relationships produce outcomes that are captured or not. The study's central thesis is relationships that mutually benefit both regulators and private market actors are bound by institutions and as a result, private influence may be enhanced and/or constrained in institutionalised settings. Regulators will use institutional mechanisms to include private actors when the demand for private power is high, and exclude private actors when the demand for private power is low. This means that whilst institutions can facilitate capture, they can also frustrate and constrain private actors from producing outcomes which are favourable to their vested interests. As a result, financial standards outcomes are likely to encapsulate both public and private interests, the extent of either depending on the supply and demand dynamics interceding with institutional mechanisms.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.599963  DOI: Not available
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