Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.595874
Title: Britain, America and the search for comprehensive naval limitation, 1927-1936
Author: Hall, Christopher G. L.
Awarding Body: University of Oxford
Current Institution: University of Oxford
Date of Award: 1982
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Abstract:
This thesis examines the regulation of naval competition between the major naval powers, and especially between Britain and the United States, under the regime of the Washington and London naval treaties, and the attempts to extend and maintain naval limitation in the period 1927 to 1936 in the face of Anglo-American rivalry and, later, the threats from Japan and Germany. Based upon British and American public and private sources, it traces the interaction of the two nations, and their relationships with other naval powers, from 1927 - when Anglo-American relations reached a nadir after the failed 'Coolidge Conference' in Geneva and the subsequen abortive 'Anglo-French Compromise' - to 1936, when naval limitation ende but by which time Anglo-American antipathy was fading in the face of mut external threats. The naval conferences of Geneva (1927) and London (19 and 1935-36), and the parallel naval side of the long-running Disarmamen Conference and its Preparatory Commission are reviewed with their attend preparations in London and Washington, and the influence of domestic factors - public opinion, financial stringency, and personal and politic prejudice - are examined. The central role of the naval balance in the relationship between the interward Great Powers is stressed, and the importance of the naval negotiations to both governments and public opinion echoes our contemporary concern for the preservation and management of the strategic balance. While the Washington-London naval system failed to halt naval rival it achieved the unforeseen consequences of permitting Britain to gracefu cede naval supremacy to the United States, under the guise of conceding 'parity', with a minimum of friction or indeed recognition of the fact. Additionally, it demonstrated by its breakdown the vulnerability of an arms limitation system that was neither geographically nor technically comprehensive.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.595874  DOI: Not available
Keywords: History ; Arms control ; Naval law ; Foreign relations ; Military relations ; 20th century ; Great Britain ; United States
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