Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.582286
Title: Large non-cooperative games : foundations and tools
Author: Stergianopoulos, Georgios
Awarding Body: University of Warwick
Current Institution: University of Warwick
Date of Award: 2012
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Abstract:
Following Schmeidler (1973) and Mas-Colell (1984), economists have typically used aggregative games with a continuum of players to model strategic environments with a large number of participants. In these games a player's payoff depends on her own strategy and on an average of the strategies of everyone in the game. Examples include corporate competition in global markets, welfare maximization in multi-period economies, strategic voting in national elections, network congestion, and environmental models of pollution or, more generally, widespread externalities. This study consists of three chapters. In Chapter 1 we unveil a weakness of the Schmeidler - Mas-Colell framework, and we develop a potential remedy that leaves the framework intact. In Chapter 2 we set the theoretical foundations for an alternative framework that is immune to the above weakness. Finally, in Chapter 3 we demonstrate how our approach accommodates types of players. We provide a number of fully worked-through examples and an appendix at the end of each chapter that includes the proofs to our propositions.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) ; Marie Curie Research Programme
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.582286  DOI: Not available
Keywords: QA Mathematics
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