This thesis examines the electronic investigations and its human rights implications, both under English law and in Egypt, drawing parallels and highlighting differences between the two jurisdictions. It considers whether the right balance has been achieved between the State's right to investigate crime and the protection of fundamental individuals' rights. It analyses (I) general rules of human rights and rights compromised in the electronic investigations both at national and international levels (chapter 2); (Il) the interception of communications, i.e. content and communications data (chapter 3); (Ill) the search and seizure of data (chapter 4); and (IV) the obligation to produce data and its key where it is encrypted, and the effect of non-compliance with such requirement (chapter 5). Particular attention is given to specific themes related to various procedures, such as the person authorising them, their justification, defining their scope as to the place/s, the person/s and the material, the conditions governing their execution, and the use made of acquired data. The thesis goes on to consider exceptions to the general rules relating to these procedures. Finally, it discusses the admissibility of material obtained by these procedures as evidence, the feasibility of copying electronic material rather than seizing it and the retention of data. The research finds that: (a) both the English and the Egyptian legal systems need to adopt approaches more protective of human rights than they currently do with regard to some measures; (b) English law needs to admit intercept evidence as it is very advantageous for investigation of crime; and (c) Egyptian law also needs to update its provisions for the effective electronic investigations, because having been written with tangible data in mind, the current arrangements now seem outdated.