Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.572258
Title: Internet auction processes and mechanisms
Author: Leung, Timothy
Awarding Body: Imperial College London
Current Institution: Imperial College London
Date of Award: 2013
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Abstract:
The nature of E-commerce over the Internet has seen significant changes over the years. Instead of companies selling items to consumers, consumers are increasingly selling items to fellow consumers on a global-scale, and Internet auctions have been the mechanism of choice in achieving this. In fact, auctioning allows the departure from the fixed price model, which some regard as too rigid to be able to respond swiftly to varying supply and demand fluctuations and changes, and the Internet plays a pivotal role in catalysing the widespread acceptance of such a variable pricing model on a global scale. Internet auctions exhibit characteristics which are often not shared by conventional auctions, e.g. auctions of xed duration which encourage sniping (bidders submit their bids moments before the close of an auction thereby preventing other bidders from submitting counter-bids), the acceptance of multiple bids in a single auction, and a maximum threshold whereby the auction will terminate at that price point. Internet auctions have significantly greater scope incorporating algorithms of increased complexity than conventional auction procedures. In this thesis, the characteristics and properties of different Internet auction algorithms are modelled mathematically based on a series of operational assumptions which characterise the arrival rate of bids, as well as the distribution from which the private values of buyers are sampled. From this, closed-form expressions of several key performance metrics are determined, including the average selling price in a given auction, as well as the average auction duration. In cases where a seller may be selling a commodity and auctions repeat themselves with the same items for sale multiple times, the income per unit time may also be qunatified. Simulation experiments have been performed and analysed in the context of the mathematical models, and reasonable agreements are observed.
Supervisor: Knottenbelt, William Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.572258  DOI: Not available
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