Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.564399
Title: Second-order logic : ontological and epistemological problems
Author: Rossberg, Marcus
Awarding Body: University of St Andrews
Current Institution: University of St Andrews
Date of Award: 2006
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Abstract:
In this thesis I provide a survey over different approaches to second-order logic and its interpretation, and introduce a novel approach. Of special interest are the questions whether (a particular form of) second-order logic can count as logic in some (further to be specified) proper sense of logic, and what epistemic status it occupies. More specifically, second-order logic is sometimes taken to be mathematical, a mere notational variant of some fragment of set theory. If this is the case, it might be argued that it does not have the "epistemic innocence" which would be needed for, e.g., foundational programmes in (the philosophy of) mathematics for which second-order logic is sometimes used. I suggest a Deductivist conception of logic, that characterises logical consequence by means of inference rules, and argue that on this conception second-order logic should count as logic in the proper sense.
Supervisor: Wright, Crispin ; Shapiro, Stewart Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.564399  DOI: Not available
Keywords: BC135.R77 ; Logic, symbolic and mathematical
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