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Title: The prospects for sufficientarianism
Author: Shields, Liam
Awarding Body: University of Warwick
Current Institution: University of Warwick
Date of Award: 2011
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Abstract:
The thesis argues that we should be optimistic about the prospects for sufficientarianism, the view that securing enough is an important part of justice. I begin by noting the different kinds of sufficientarianism that have been advocated and the objections that they are vulnerable to. I then ask whether these objections apply to all, or only some, versions of sufficientarianism. To answer this question I characterize sufficientarianism generally, highlighting its main claims, and I argue that sufficientarianism can avoid these objections. I then argue that we can and should re-examine the prospects for sufficientarianism, so understood, by exploring two lines of argument. The first line of argument claims that sufficiency principles will be indispensable where we have certain reasons which can support a shift, I call these sufficientarian reasons. The second line of argument claims that sufficiency principles will be indispensable where there are clashes between values and where once one value is realized to a certain extent the importance of promoting that value further shifts relative to the other value. In Chapter Two I argue that a sufficientarian reason to live under the conditions of freedom supports the principle of sufficient autonomy, and in Chapter Three I argue that this principle should have an extensive role in our thought. In Chapter Four I argue that the principle of the good enough upbringing provides us with the most plausible resolution to the conflict we encounter between children and parent’s interests when we consider the distribution of the right to rear children. I also show that this principle should have an extensive role in our thought. I conclude that we should be optimistic about the prospects for sufficientarianism because there are at least two indispensable sufficiency principles and they should have an extensive role in our thought about important practical debates.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.560238  DOI: Not available
Keywords: BD Speculative Philosophy
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