Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.552405
Title: Real impossible worlds : the bounds of possibility
Author: Kiourti, Ira Georgia
Awarding Body: University of St Andrews
Current Institution: University of St Andrews
Date of Award: 2010
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Abstract:
Lewisian Genuine Realism (GR) about possible worlds is often deemed unable to accommodate impossible worlds and reap the benefits that these bestow to rival theories. This thesis explores two alternative extensions of GR into the terrain of impossible worlds. It is divided in six chapters. Chapter I outlines Lewis’ theory, the motivations for impossible worlds, and the central problem that such worlds present for GR: How can GR even understand the notion of an impossible world, given Lewis’ reductive theoretical framework? Since the desideratum is to incorporate impossible worlds into GR without compromising Lewis’ reductive analysis of modality, Chapter II defends that analysis against (old and new) objections. The rest of the thesis is devoted to incorporating impossible worlds into GR. Chapter III explores GR-friendly impossible worlds in the form of set-theoretic constructions out of genuine possibilia. Then, Chapters IV-VI venture into concrete impossible worlds. Chapter IV addresses Lewis’ objection against such worlds, to the effect that contradictions true at impossible worlds amount to true contradictions tout court. I argue that even if so, the relevant contradictions are only ever about the non-actual, and that Lewis’ argument relies on a premise that cannot be nonquestion- beggingly upheld in the face of genuine impossible worlds in any case. Chapter V proposes that Lewis’ reductive analysis can be preserved, even in the face of genuine impossibilia, if we differentiate the impossible from the possible by means of accessibility relations, understood non-modally in terms of similarity. Finally, Chapter VI counters objections to the effect that there are certain impossibilities, formulated in Lewis’ theoretical language, which genuine impossibilia should, but cannot, represent. I conclude that Genuine Realism is still very much in the running when the discussion turns to impossible worlds.
Supervisor: Hawley, Katherine; Priest, Graham; Read, Stephen Sponsor: Arts and Humanities Research Council ; University of St Andrews
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.552405  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Impossible worlds ; Lewisian realism about possible worlds ; Extending Lewisian realism into impossible worlds ; Lewisian modal realism ; Reductive theories of modality ; David Lewis ; Plenitude ; Arbitrariness ; Circularity ; Recombination ; Impossible worlds & the reduction of the modal ; Ersatz impossibilia out of Lewis-worlds ; Lewis-friendly ersatz worlds ; Concrete impossible worlds ; Actual truth versus truth simpliciter ; Negation at concrete impossible worlds ; Negation commutation ; Concrete impossibilia & contradiction ; Reasoning about Lewisian realism with impossibilia ; Modality as world similarity ; Relative Modality ; Relative impossibilia ; Logical similarity between worlds ; "The logical laws of w" ; Representing impossibilities about the plurality ; Concrete impossibilism ; Truth-at-w & literal truth ; BC199.P7K5 ; Possibility ; Lewis ; David K. ; 1941- ; Modality (Logic) ; Realism
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