Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.552290
Title: Lewis, counterfactual analyses of causation, and pre-emption cases
Author: Landsberg, David
Awarding Body: University of St Andrews
Current Institution: University of St Andrews
Date of Award: 2009
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Abstract:
Over the past few decades analyses of causation have proliferated in almost immeasurable abundance, and with two things in common; firstly, they make much of counterfactual dependence, and secondly, none of them successfully handle all the pre-emption cases. In this thesis, I fore-mostly investigate David Lewis’ promising counterfactual analyses of causation (along with many others), and provide an extensive examination of pre-emption cases. I also offer my own counterfactual analysis of causation, which I argue can handle the problematic pre-emption cases, and therein succeed where so many other prominent analyses of causation have failed. I then conclude with some morals for the continuing debate.
Supervisor: Hawley, Katherine Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.552290  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Causation ; Metaphysics ; BD591.L2 ; Lewis ; David K. ; 1941- Contributions in concept of causation ; Causation ; Counterfactuals (Logic)
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