Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.547774
Title: A conception of equality of opportunity
Author: Lazenby, Hugh T. C.
Awarding Body: University of Oxford
Current Institution: University of Oxford
Date of Award: 2011
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Abstract:
This thesis defends a conception of equality of opportunity. It comes in two parts. The first part elaborates the conception. It begins by clarifying the concept of equality of opportunity, showing it to be made up of four basic elements: a distributive pattern, a set of subjects, an opportunity obstacle and a distributive object. The conception I build from these elements explains the value of the distributive pattern, equality, in terms of a concern for fairness, takes persons as its subject and takes well-being as its object. The conception presented is partial, rather than comprehensive, in that it does not include a detailed account of an opportunity obstacle. The conception of equality of opportunity that I present can also be characterised as a luck egalitarian principle. My aim in elaborating the conception is to show that it has intuitive appeal; it constitutes a pro tanto moral principle. The second part of the thesis examines the implications of luck egalitarianism in two contexts. It begins by examining the context of gifts, arguing that although luck egalitarianism is highly restrictive with respect to the freedom to give this only confirms that it is a merely pro tanto moral principle. It continues by examining the context of markets, arguing that luck egalitarianism makes intuitively correct judgments in several specified cases. My aim in applying luck egalitarianism is to show that its implications do not give us reason to reject its initial intuitive appeal. I examine luck egalitarianism generally, rather then the partial conception I elaborate, to allow for the possibility that my earlier arguments are wrong in some respect. Overall, I hope the arguments presented provide reasons to accept the conception presented as morally valuable.
Supervisor: Swift, Adam Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.547774  DOI: Not available
Keywords: Ethics (Moral philosophy) ; Social justice ; equality ; luck ; fairness
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