Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.487122
Title: A Theory of Value.
Author: Leonard , Kahn
Awarding Body: University of Oxford
Current Institution: University of Oxford
Date of Award: 2007
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Abstract:
In this thesis, I articulate and defend a theory of value. The theory has three main parts: The Bi-Conditional Judgment Claim: To j~dge that X is valuable is to judge that X has properties that provide reason for certain responses toward X. The Bi-Conditional Propertv Claim: For X to be valuable is for X to have properties that provide reason for certain responses toward X. The Buck-Passing Claim: Value does not provide any reason for any of the responses mentioned in the Bi-Conditional Property Claim. Call these 'the three main claims.' In Chapter 1, I lay the groundwork for the thesis by briefly giving an account of valuing. Then I clarify the three main claims and their relation to my account of valuing. In Chapter 2, I revisit G.E. Moore's famous Open-Question Argument and contend that it supports the three main claims at least as well as it supports Moore's own account of value against various fOnTIS of reductive naturalism. In Chapter 3. I expand on T.M. Scanlon's argument in favor of the Buck-Passing Claim against Moore's account. In Chapter 4. I consider and reject the main criticisms of th~ two Bi- Page 8 \,.- OJ,' v· _.. .. Conditional Claims. Finally, in Chapter 5, I -consider a way in' which the three main claims can be reconciled with non-reductive naturalism, similar to (but not identical with) Cornell Realism.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: University of Oxford, 2007 Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.487122  DOI: Not available
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