Use this URL to cite or link to this record in EThOS: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.474250
Title: The Abstract God: An Examination of Charles Hartshorne's Modal Ontological Argument and his Conception of the Metaphysical Attributes of Deity.
Author: Surin, K.
Awarding Body: University of Birmingham
Current Institution: University of Birmingham
Date of Award: 1976
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Abstract:
In this thesis I examine an aspect of Charles Hartshorne's dipolar conception of deity-- namely, the abstract, in contrast to the concrete, aspect or pole. The thesis falls into two parts. The first part deals with Hartshorne's modal ontological argument. Here I use a possible worlds semantics to reformulate and evaluate Hartshorne's argument. I find it to be valid, but in working out a 'holistic' religious epistemology based on the work of W.V. Quine, I argue that if its premises and conclusion are to make determinate assertions, then they cannot be known to be true in the way required by an ~ priori argument (which Hartshorne's argument purports to be). My conclusion is that the argument is really an axiomatization of the argument from religious experience. The second part of the thesis is devoted to an examination of Hartshorne's conception of the metaphysical attributes of deity; here I consider seven attributes: aseity, infinity, unity, eternity, immutability, impassibility, and simplicity. I discuss Hartshorne's views in comparison with the conception that prevails in orthodox christian theism. I schematise the arguments of Hartshorne and these orthodox theists, usually in semi-formal terms, and evaluate the resulting schematizations for their validity, cogency, etc •• The main intention is to modify Hartshorne's position to avoid the charge that his conception is self-contradictory. 1 conclude by proposing a way in which these modifications can be carried out.
Supervisor: Not available Sponsor: Not available
Qualification Name: Thesis (Ph.D.) Qualification Level: Doctoral
EThOS ID: uk.bl.ethos.474250  DOI: Not available
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