Minority rights in international law : minority rights and identity-conscious decision-making
The work aims to test a simple idea with complex implications. Minority rights, as currently posited in international law, can be interpreted according to either a strong or weak model of minority rights. This thesis defends the position that neither model deserves recognition as the sole paradigm for our understanding of minority rights in international law. It shall be argued that minority rights should be given (and are increasingly being given) a `context-sensitive' interpretation both in the definition and classification of minorities (dealt with in the first two chapters) and in the analysis of the scope of the rights of persons belonging to minorities (which is dealt with in the remaining chapters). It shall be argued that, in both the definition and classification of minorities and in the treatment of minority rights, the relevant law can be interpreted according to either of two traditional paradigms, the weak and strong models of minority rights. Both of these traditional paradigms are consistent with (but are not exclusively based upon) particular approaches to the definition of a 'minority'.