The principles of nuclear control
This thesis develops the principles of nuclear control which are derived from control models initially developed in the 1940s, namely, The Acheson-Lilienthal Report, and the Baruch Plan. Authors of these works aspired to create a grand disarmament scheme establishing an international authority to manage nuclear energy and to prevent states from diverting nuclear energy production to nuclear weapon development. They identified principles, which they believed needed to be incorporated in any nuclear control plan, if the plan was to be effective in promoting international security and stability. The thesis then examines control models that were actually established and explores how they diverged from the suggested principles identified previously. In protecting states' economic and political sovereignty, a series of compromises were made on meeting principles of control. Political realities forced states to settle on a national inspection system (the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System) which sought to detect the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons. This type system was initially considered by analysts of the Baruch era but was emphatically rejected as having weaknesses that would undermine the system's effectiveness. Although decision makers were aware of the damage that compromises on the principles could have on the control system's effectiveness, they believed some imperfect control system was better than none at all. The thesis shows that departures of the established model from the earlier model weakened control system effectiveness as predicted by Baruch era analysts. This less rigourous adopted approach achieved broad international acceptability, but could not provide sufficient assurances to all parties. As a consequence, some governments took unilateral action to enhance their security in the face of inadequate controls and/or engaged in efforts to strengthen the system. The mechanisms they created incorporated some of the basic nuclear control principles originally identified a half-century earlier but were rejected on political grounds. The thesis sheds light on the difficulties in implementing control and the relevance of these implementation problems for disarmament. It highlights the struggle between states' desires for more credible systems requiring greater sacrifices on national sovereignty and a need for broad adherence to international control demanding less intrusiveness and wider benefits. The thesis reveals a long-term trend that states appear more willing to accept international control measures as globalisation occurs and concludes that the control system is evolving towards incorporating the principles identified in the 1940s that were not included in the established system.