International relations between the U.S. and Spain 1945-53 : economics, ideology and compromise
This is a study of the relations between Spain and the United States from the end of the Second World War to the conclusion of the Madrid Agreements which were signed in September 1953. Through these agreements Spain obtained military and economic aid from the US. At the same time she was integrated into the western defence structure. In return Franco authorized the US to construct and use military bases, some of which were situated near Spanish cities. Furthermore the agreements limited Spain's foreign, economic and monetary policies. The structure of the thesis is determined by the chronological events of the late 1940s and early 1950s. The international background is analysed in the first part of the thesis, running up to July 1951. The second part covers the negotiations between the two countries. By following the chronological events of the negotiations, the thesis tries to assess which of the two parties was willing to compromise in key aspects. Most of the thesis is based on American primary sources throughout the period. Many of the arguments developed contrast directly with those already put forward, notably by Spanish historians. The picture which emerges indicates that Washington, as well as Spain, had great military and strategic interests in signing the Madrid Agreements. This is surprising given the findings by other investigators that Spain was forced almost by circumstances into these agreements. The thesis tries to develop a counter-argument which, hopefully, lays the foundation for a constructive discussion on the issue.