Japan and the peace and friendship treaties with Moscow and Peking
In August of 1978, Japanese and Chinese officials reached agreement on a Peace and Friendship Treaty which had been the subject of sporadic negotiations since the two sides normalised relations in 1972. But Japan also signed a Joint Declaration in 1956 with the Soviet Union, a bilateral agreement which also called for a future Peace and Friendship Treaty, which still has not been signed. The first section of the thesis deals with domestic historical, political, economic and cultural factors which affect foreign policy in each of the three countries and which have particular bearing on the treaty negotiations. Major emphasis is placed on those developments which have affected national security, or which have a bearing on collective perceptions of national security, including the strength of the armed forces. The second and longer portion of the thesis deals with Japan's bilateral relations with each of its two neighbours historically, and in more recent times in economic, political, military and cultural terms, and with key issues and developments in bilateral negotiations on the treaties. Throughout this section the primary focus is on Japan, its political parties and factions and the positions these have taken on the treaties and issues related to the treaties throughout the years. It also deals with the key issues dividing Japan and its negotiating partners on the two treaties, as well as Japan's 'equidistance policy' and 'its 'special relationship' with the United States. Conclusions at the end of part one in Section Two include points about the special constraints imposed upon the USSR in its negotiations, the importance of fishing rights in the Russo-Japanese relationship, the impact of the Ussuri River incidents of 1969 on the policies of Moscow and Peking and the phenomenon of two separate foreign policy goals working at cross-purposes on both sides in the bilateral relations between Moscow and Tokyo. Conclusions at the end of the thesis deal with the trilateral relationship and with such questions as why one treaty was signed and why the other has not been at this writing, whether there is any real substance to the new treaty, whether its signing is a setback to Soviet foreign policy and a threat to Soviet security and finally, what prompted Japan to abandon its 'equidistance policy'. The role of the White House and the State Department, and the question of how Japan came to be in the uncomfortable position of pawn or 'prize' in the Sino-Soviet rivalry are also examined.