US Foreign Policy to Pakistan, 1947-1960 : re-constructing strategy
The thesis analyses US policy to Pakistan between 1947 and 1960 by using a theoretical framework beyond the positivist-empiricist nexus that dominates much of International Relations and especially its dominant school, Realism. This nexus considers the world to be self-evident, which requires independent observers to passively pick up. The thesis rejects this epistemological position by demonstrating that reality is interdependent between subject and object, that knowing reality depends on the subject that is analysing as much as the object that is being analysed. The first part of this thesis thus develops a framework to accommodate this interdependence, one based on identity narratives. Identity narratives are accounts of how the self came to be, where it came from, what it is and where it is going. These stories explain how political subjects categorise, attach meaning and ultimately engage reality. Thus, four American identities, with corresponding narratives, are selected: exceptionalism, capitalism, Anglo-Saxon and missionary. Further, a meta-identity in anti-communism is also used. This framework is applied on archival and other material relating to US policy to Pakistan between 1947 and 1960. The thesis demonstrates Washington's exclusive deployment of its anti-communist narrative to understand Pakistan since America could only categorise and attach meaning to Pakistan in the context of communist issues and could not fit into any other American identity narrative. Initially in 1947, American failed to make sense of Pakistan given the speed of Pakistan's creation, American distraction elsewhere and its inability to place Karachi into any of its identity narratives. However, as the anti-communist identity intensified, as it did during 1950-1954, Pakistan was attached meaning as a supporter of America's anti-communist narrative and therefore was engaged as an ally, located in the communist- vulnerable Middle East. When American anti-communism eased and Pakistan overtly abandoned its anti-communist guise, both of which occurred during 1957-1960, Pakistan lost meaning to America, which led to American attempts to disengage Pakistan. Interestingly, neither of America's two policies, being the engagement and disengagement of Pakistan, was especially dependent on calculations of Pakistan's military or economic contribution to the Cold War. In contrast, policy to India reflected the dialectic deployment of anti-communist and missionary narratives for Washington re-located the continuation of its missionary identity narrative through India after China's sudden rejection of its aged role within that narrative.