Institutional capacity and multiple conditionality in ACP-EU development cooperation
The negotiations for the Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Lome Convention marked the introduction of multiple conditionality - economic adjustment and good governance - into the Lome relationship. It placed additional demands on the two parties, giving rise to the essential concern of this thesis: do the two sides possess the requisite institutional capacity to meet those demands. The introduction was not a sudden development. The origins of multiple conditionality lay in the Pisani Memorandum and its proposal of policy dialogue. The path from the proposal to multiple conditionality was assisted by developments within the Lome relationship, including the unintended effects of ACP initiatives. This thesis is thus, in one sense, the history of the Memorandum's legacy of inverted conditionality through policy dialogue. It is also an analysis of the capacities generated by the Convention and their applicability to multiple conditionality. My analysis of bargaining, operational and instrumental capacities demonstrates a weak ACP capacity and an asymmetrically greater EU capacity. My initial conclusion is that the EU is much more capable of meeting the demands of multiple conditionality. However, it too faces limits on its capacity, especially in dealing with the sociopolitical aspects of governance. This recognition highlights an ignored factor: there is a second legacy of the Pisani Memorandum. In addition to the instrument of policy dialogue, the Memorandum identified institutional capacity as the means to help overcome the problems of development. The new tale of two legacies illustrates an EU emphasis on policy control at the expense of capacity building. It has failed to perceive the importance of the link, in the Pisani Memorandum, between the instrument and the means. It forces me to amend my initial conclusion: neither side is adequately prepared for the demands of multiple conditionality.