The conduct of the Korean War, 1950-1953, with the emphasis on the civilian control over the military in the United States
This is a case study to examine the practice of civil-military relations as evolved within the governmental organization of the United States in its conduct of the Korean War. It intends to analyse the civil-military relations from the point of view that the military is not an 'opponent' but a 'component' of the civil authority in a democratic society. In Introduction, the theory of civil-military relations and the aim of this research are briefed. Chapter one describes the historical background of American civil-military relations which influenced the conduct of the Korean War. Chapter two shows the process of decision-making to intervene in the war on the part of the U.S. Administration. In Chapter three, the theory of limited war is examined as well as the debates about it within the United States. Chapter four is a close examination of the development of the controversy between President Truman and General MacArthur in connection with Inchon landing operation, Formosa affair, Chinese intervention in the war, and MacArthur's insubordination. Chapter five examines the aftermath of MacArthur's dismissal which brought the loss of 'feedback function' within the U.S. military. Chapter six shows the process of the truce conference and ending of the war with the inauguration of the Eisenhower Administration. This research attempts to show that the problem during the war was not the usurpation of civil power by the military but the imbalance between the military objective and the means allowed to use.